IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

More than a decade after the Cold War, the US-Russian relationship maintains an axiomatic position in international affairs. Due to the important roles of both countries, it remains in US interests to improve its relationship with Russia. The election of the Bush administration provides a fresh opportunity to shape US-Russian relations. One of the key areas where cooperation is feasible is in peacekeeping efforts, which play an important role in the post-Cold War world. By cooperating with Russia in combined peacekeeping, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and providing support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in its near abroad,[1] as in Georgia, the US has the opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship.

The authors seek to provide an academic basis for improving combined peacekeeping (PK) efforts and supporting Russian PK operations in their near abroad by answering three main questions:

1. *Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad?*
2. *In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping?*
3. *What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these areas?*

We begin by analyzing the significance of US-Russian relations and the impact combined peacekeeping and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts have on the US-Russian relationship. After examining the importance of cooperation in peacekeeping, we then assesses Russian peacekeeping policy and forces to determine the quality and nature of Russian peacekeeping and where it will most likely be applied in the future. Next, we provide two case studies, Bosnia and Abkhazia (Georgia), to evaluate Russian peacekeeping in each of the two main peacekeeping arenas where Russia is likely to engage:

combined operations in the Balkans and Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) activities in the near abroad. Using insights from each of these cases, we then look at ways the US is able to and would most benefit from providing support for Russian peacekeeping. Finally, based on this assessment, we recommend specific courses of action to improve cooperation within combined peacekeeping and support for peacekeeping in the near abroad, as well as the most robust recommendations that can be applied across both arenas in order to improve relations.

Significance of the US-Russian Relationship

While the relationship between Russia and the US has deteriorated over the past five years, the importance of the relationship remains evident because of Russia's nuclear strength. Many scholars argue that the future of a reforming Russia, if not handled correctly, is one of the greatest threats to US national interests.[2] Although the effectiveness of its military equipment continues to diminish, Russia maintains significant military might and influence, with its vast nuclear arsenal and its military dominance over the former Soviet states. In addition, there are a number of issues of concern to national security shared by both Russia and the United States. Transnational problems such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism can best be solved through a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Given Russia's significant position in global affairs and its ability to influence and assist proliferating nations, an uncooperative relationship would be detrimental to US national security.

At the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States had high expectations for a close, cooperative partnership to be achieved. Russia looked to the US to provide economic support and advice for its developing democracy, and the US sought cooperation on the nuclear drawdown and security and other transnational issues. At the height of this partnership was the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) to draw down and secure nuclear forces and the successful agreement incorporating Russia into the peacekeeping force sent to implement the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Relations between NATO and Russia also took a positive turn

in May 1997 with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Founding Act established the Permanent Joint Council made up of NATO countries and Russia. The act provides a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, where appropriate, for joint decisions and actions with respect to security issues of common concern.[3] The Founding Act places Russia at a higher status with NATO than other non-NATO countries in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

Since the initial successful cooperation between the US and Russia in Bosnia, the relationship has deteriorated. Russia's dismal economy, due in part to poor advice from the West and disillusionment with democracy, coupled with their perception of a hostile, expanding NATO and the West's treatment of them as a secondary power, has led to distrust and a state of non-cooperation. While discussion on START III has increased, the US and Russia frequently disagree over START II and the ABM treaty, a key component of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Deeply engulfed in the Chechnya conflict, Russia resents Western, and particularly US, criticism over their methods of waging war and has increased its anti-West and anti-NATO rhetoric. The US, for its part, has chosen not to give Russia a place at the table in NATO and has been reluctant to provide any further support for Russia's transition to a free market, while at the same time contemplating the construction of a national missile defense system that has greatly upset Russia. Recent revelations of continued espionage efforts and the expulsion of foreign diplomats from both countries have further exacerbated the situation. The relationship with Russia is judged by many to be at a post-Cold War low with little hope for improvement.

However, recent political changes inside Russia have provided the US and Russia with an opportunity to expand relations. Although the relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin remains uncertain, Putin commented on his desire to work with NATO as "equal partners" after a year of tensions over issues such as Kosovo and Chechnya.[4] Putin enjoys a high enough level of domestic support from the Russian people to allow him a

significant role in shaping the future of Russia's security and economy, and the new US administration should seize the opportunity to reinvigorate the post-Cold War cooperation.

Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping

Given the significance of the US-Russian relationship and the present tension, the US should look for areas to improve this relationship. The recent increase in peace operations in the second post-Cold War era provides the US and Russia just such an opportunity. Russia has and continues to be an important player in these operations in the Balkans, its near abroad, and UN missions worldwide. With a lack of more conventional threats, peacekeeping operations are the most visible and likely way to increase cooperation between US and Russian forces.

Currently, the US and Russia are successfully working together in SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, and to a lesser extent, in several UN missions. Two former Cold War enemies working side by side in peacekeeping operations provides evidence to the world of the professionalism and capabilities of both military forces and enriches the US-Russian relationship.[5] The more often the two militaries are able to operate together, the more likely they will be able to close both operational and cultural gaps that hamper successful missions. For example, Brigadier General Peterson (US Army) attributes much of his successful cooperation with the Russian troops in the beginning of KFOR's establishment to his working with the Russians in Bosnia and thus understanding their peacekeeping forces and doctrine.[6] If the two countries are to work together in future peacekeeping efforts or other low-intensity conflicts, then well-planned and efficient operations today will aid in effective operations in the future.

The interaction between the two militaries in peacekeeping operations provides an area of engagement between higher political figures. Regardless of other events affecting the relationship, involvement in peacekeeping operations offers, at a bare minimum, a reason for interaction because both nations are committed to a number of peacekeeping operations. While there are often disagreements over political issues that may be harmful to the

relationship, it is nevertheless important that dialogue occurs and there is a continued agreement on the involvement of the two countries.

US-Russian cooperation provides a special degree of impartiality and legitimacy to the peacekeeping operation, whether real or perceived, in the world arena. Joint involvement gives both sides a greater chance of being accepted as part of an impartial peacekeeping force. This is particularly important to the US in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo because it dampens criticism of Western partiality and heavy-handedness. The coming together of the Cold War superpowers provides a sense of legitimacy and commitment to resolve conflict. This show of commitment will perhaps encourage more hesitant states to participate in peacekeeping activities when they might otherwise choose not to, and it will decrease the likelihood of any party opposing the peacekeeping action.

In addition to being important for the US-Russian relationship, cooperation in peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and the near abroad helps the US protect and promote its interests in those areas. The Balkans continue to be a flash point for European security. The US already has a strong commitment in the region, with troops participating in peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Considering the US ties with Europe, developing and maintaining peace in the Balkans is of great importance to the US. Conflicts in the Balkans threaten not only mass atrocities and large refugee flows, but also a possible spread of the conflict into other regions of Europe.

US interests in the near abroad do not justify as strong a commitment of resources as in the Balkans. For the most part, recent US policy in Russia's near abroad has been to offer economic and political support for nascent democracies, while acknowledging Russia's prominence in the region and encouraging them to solve some of the crises left behind when the Soviet Union broke apart. Russia's suspicion of US designs on the region has caused the US to defer to Russian prerogatives on many occasions. However, while they should not be overstated, the US does have several interests in the near abroad that should be protected: (1) preventing the conflicts from spreading

into neighboring countries such as Turkey (a NATO ally) or Iran and growing into regional conflagrations, (2) helping these new countries develop strong democracies and free market economies where the rights of the citizens are respected and opportunities for investment are protected, (3) securing the developing Transcausasus oil pipeline, and (4) ensuring that the peacekeeping missions carried out respect the human rights of the inhabitants. These interests in the near abroad must be balanced with the implications any US actions will have on the US-Russia relationship.

ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING

Although combined peacekeeping efforts and support for Russian peacekeeping will benefit the US-Russian strategic relationship, the US must balance this interest with its interest in successfully accomplishing its peacekeeping tasks. The US must therefore assess Russian peacekeeping to decide what areas of cooperation in peacekeeping efforts would be most beneficial for achieving US objectives, both to improve the relationship and ensure the success and legitimacy of the peacekeeping operation. This assessment analyzes the Russian political environment, forces, and doctrine for peacekeeping operations.

Russian Political Environment

Russian Goals and Objectives in Peacekeeping Activities

Russia's involvement in peacekeeping activities stems from its national interests and the perceived threats to those interests. According to the Russian Federation National Security Concept, the basic external threats to Russian national security are due to, among other factors:

1. the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world;
2. the appearance and escalation of conflicts near the Russian state border and CIS external borders; and
3. an attempt to minimize the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[7]

These threats provide the rationale for Russia's involvement in peacekeeping in the near abroad, the Balkans, and UN operations under UN, CIS, or OSCE auspices.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, one of Russia's primary security concerns has been to demonstrate to the rest of the international community that it remains a powerful state and will play an important role in the New World Order. As part of this effort, Russian leaders actively seek a peacekeeping role for their military. Involvement in peacekeeping is seen as necessary if Russia is to continue to maintain significant influence and prestige in the international community.[8] Russia's participation in peacekeeping operations in the near abroad, the Balkans, and within the UN illustrates its desire to be a contributing member of the world community.

Another of Russia's primary security concerns is to contain any threat that appears on its borders. These conflicts in former Soviet states have occurred frequently in recent years as a result of a decline in the population's standard of living and as a result of ethnic, interreligious and other conflicts.[9] Russia often gets involved in these conflicts because no other security apparatus is willing or available to take on the mission and the conflicts threaten to spill over into Russian territory or endanger the Russian population in the state.

Russia also has an interest in maintaining its influence in these regions. Peacekeeping forces allow Russia to maintain influence, as well as military bases, in these former Soviet states, providing an arena to shape the region and maintain access to natural resources. The Russian forces in the near abroad act under CIS auspices so that they appear more legitimate to the rest of the international community. For the most part, however, only a negligible number of forces from other CIS nations ever participate in these missions. Although Russia maintains that it becomes involved in peacekeeping efforts on CIS territory at the request of other CIS states seeking Russia's assistance in settling the conflict,[10] it has been accused of strong-arming these former Soviet republics into accepting peacekeeping forces. This quite possibly happened in Abkhazia, where Georgia was left with little choice

but to join the CIS and accept a CIS peacekeeping force that ensured continued Russian presence on its territory.[11] One of the primary reasons Russia pursues zealous peacekeeping forms and mechanisms in the UN and regional organizations is to support these interventions in the near abroad with a conceptual, legal and practical framework. The actual peacekeeping mandates in the near abroad demonstrate that Russia is focused on keeping the conflict to a minimum and is less likely to pursue more ambitious objectives to resolve the crisis and thus remove the need for Russian troop presence.

Further threats to Russian security stem from Russian perceptions of NATO's actions in Kosovo. According to the Russian National Security Concept, "NATO's transition to the practice of military operations of force without UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction is fraught with the threat of destabilizing the entire strategic situation in the world."[12] While the working relationship between NATO and Russian forces in SFOR and KFOR remains on a successful and steady path, Russian policy maintains that it is not willing to transform its equipment and safety procedures to NATO standards of operation. Therefore, according to the primary Russian military representative to the UN, Russia will not look to participate in any further joint operations with NATO.[13] However, as mentioned previously, President Putin has expressed a willingness to cooperate with NATO as long as Russia was considered an equal partner in the operation.[14] This may be seen as encouragement that Russia is willing to work through some of the difficulties and compromise to enhance NATO-Russian cooperation.

Together, the Russian security interests and threats to those interests have led to its foreign policy focus on strengthening key mechanisms for multilateral management of world political and economic processes, and keeping Russian assistance in settling conflicts under the aegis of the UN, OSCE, or CIS.[15] Russia has been particularly interested in strengthening the UNSC, where it has veto power, and in receiving UN mandates and money for its CIS peacekeeping forces in the near abroad.

Russian Military in the Political Forum

The military plays a significant role in Russian politics. Recent military operations like Kosovo and Chechnya provide examples of the type of pressure ranking military generals are able to put on politicians. In November 1999, Russian generals were pressing publicly for an all-out military victory against Chechen rebels, and in "unusually strident fashion warning Russian politicians to get out of the way."[16] In interviews, Russian commanders stated that they would not be robbed of their victory as politicians had allowed in 1996. General Anatoli Kvashin, then Chief of the Russian General Staff, threatened to resign when President Yelstin's administration proposed sending out peace feelers to Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen leader. General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the western group of forces in Chechnya, warned that if an order came down from Moscow "to stop the army, there would be a massive defection of officers of all ranks from the armed forces, including generals."[17]

A similar situation arose in June 1999 when some 200 Russian troops left their posts in Bosnia and headed into Kosovo, taking over the Pristina airport. This move forced the rest of the international community to face the frightening possibility that Russia's military, which has been under-funded and humiliated for years, may now be forcing the Kremlin to bend to its views.[18] To many, the fact that the Russian military was able to "bypass most of the country's top civilian decision-makers showed that Yelstin had a new set of favorites—Russian generals with a bleak view of the outside world and its designs."[19] For the US, this military influence on political affairs makes cooperation with the Russian military even more important for improving security relations.

Russian Peacekeeping Forces

Since the Cold War, the Russian military has been in turmoil. While the US forces underwent a significant drawdown in the 1990's, the Russian military cutbacks have been described as a virtual freefall.[20] Their forces went from numbering 4.3 million active duty personnel in 1986 to 1.27 million in 1996.[21] Along with force cutbacks has come an enormous drop in military

expenditures. In 1999, the military was allocated $3.7 billion, or 2.3 percent of Russia's GDP, down almost $2 billion from the original presidential decision of $5.6 billion, but it failed to receive even that amount.[22] This underfunding has caused severe payment delays and underfunding of defense sector needs, thus undermining military training programs, research and design projects, production and supplies of new types of military equipment, and the maintenance and repair of equipment in service.[23] With the current state of the Russian military, any peacekeeping effort is certain to be challenged by insufficient funding, a lack of training, outdated equipment, poor equipment maintenance, and morale problems due to payment arrears and other personnel issues.

Although it suffers from great financial problems, the Russian military maintains two different types of training for peacekeeping forces: UN peacekeepers and the airborne and motorized rifle divisions designated for deployment to peacekeeping operations. Those going to participate as UN observers must be trained at the Vystrel Academy near Moscow for a period of two to three months. The Academy trains three groups of students per year using UN doctrine and guidelines for training its forces.[24] According to US General John Reppert, former defense attaché to Moscow, this is one of the only academies of its sort with this type of extensive training exclusively using UN materials.[25] The school is taught in English and includes exchange students from several nations, including the US, although currently there are no US students there. It has both political and military faculty, often bringing in foreigners to help teach UN doctrine and practices. The UN observers produced by the Vystrel Academy have been noted as quality participants in UN peacekeeping operations. Russia has recently designated two battalions and their required support structure to be at the UN's disposal.[26]

The forces Russia uses for other peacekeeping situations (working with NATO, the CIS, or unilaterally) are led by the Airborne Forces (VDV). VDV forces are equipped with light armor, which are deployable by standard military transport aviation and have maintained a high level of discipline, training, and combat experience.[27] The peacekeeping environment

corresponds to the VDV's wartime mission to work far in enemy rear areas cut off from main lines of logistical support and to learn to deal with the local populace.[28] As Commander of the VDV, Colonel-General Shpak has designated unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping as his units' main peacetime mission and has put his effort towards the development of command, control and intelligence systems and the maintenance of discipline and effectiveness at the small unit level.[29] The Russian airborne divisions have better training and mobility than most of the Russian troops, though they suffer from logistical problems and have not been able to maintain their units at full strength. Along with the VDV, Russia has designated two motorized rifle divisions (MRD's) for service in peacekeeping operations. Officers sent to peacekeeping missions receive three months of training prior to deployment, while enlisted troops receive six months of training.[30] The training program gives considerable attention "to preparing personnel for independent actions in an environment and in situations where use of weapons is prohibited."[31]

Unlike the conflict in Chechnya, Russia uses only volunteer soldiers for its peacekeeping missions. While personnel have for the most part been sufficiently trained for their missions, many of the other essentials for a successful mission have been lacking. The units are often at low strength when called upon, as in the example of Georgia when the 145th Motorized Rifle Division was called to provide forces for the Abkhazia conflict and it only had 3,000 of its allotted 13,000 troops.[32] When the troops do arrive, they often lack the necessary equipment to complete their assigned task, as they did after the taking of the Pristina airport when the Russian troops were soon asking the British troops for water.[33] Russian equipment is old and the military's ability to maintain it often inadequate, with the result that many of their vehicles and machinery are simply unusable. The Russian forces, though capable, are hampered by insufficient finances and outdated equipment.

Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine

The Russian peacekeeping doctrine springs from its experience in the field. Russia's peacekeeping experiences are much different from those of most

other nations. Having been influenced by Russia's initial experience after the Cold War, they bear more of a counter-insurgency flavor.[34] Russian operations have differed from typical peacekeeping operations in several ways. First, all of Russia's operations were in "Russia's backyard," where Russia is the strongest player in the region and the military commanders are very familiar with the environment. Second, Russian activities were not constrained by anything besides the available means, the resolve of the command in Moscow, and political infighting or indecisiveness.[35] Problems of legitimacy, rules of engagement, collateral damage, and public scrutiny were raised but did not have a significant effect on operations as compared to most other UN operations.[36] A third difference is that indecisiveness, and at times incompetence, of political leadership often forced or allowed local military commanders to act autonomously with little guidance or support.[37] These differences have led to a uniquely Russian view of peacekeeping operations that looks at the issue as primarily a military rather than political problem and thus bypasses the creation of a political solution.

The Russian term most often used for peacekeeping operations is "miro-tvorcheskiye operatzii," or peace-creation operations, showing Russia's penchant towards a greater use of force in keeping the peace. Russia has recently developed a new military doctrine for peacekeeping. According to Lieutenant-General Meleshkov, the Russian military representative to the UN Military Staff Committee, this policy breaks peacekeeping into three main tasks: (1) separate the warring parties, (2) ensure provision of humanitarian aid and evacuation of refugees, and (3) carry out the provisions of the mandate.[38] The Russians do not use a doctrine that complies with the three UN principles of consent and invitation of all parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense.[39] Instead, their actions more resemble the criteria put forth by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*: the peacekeeping force may intervene without the consent of all parties, the force does not necessarily seek to be impartial, and offensive use of weapons may be required.[40]

While Russia's peacekeeping methods derive naturally from some of their experiences in the field, the West has often criticized Russian methods. Three main issues cause frequent conflict between the Russian and Western philosophies of peacekeeping: (1) Russia's extensive use of force, (2) criticisms of Russian partiality, and (3) the use of belligerents in the peacekeeping force. Each is examined below.

1. Extensive Use of Force: The Russian doctrine allows for the use of force to separate belligerents and force them to the negotiating table, a different approach than that of the UN, which requires the consent of all the parties to the conflict.[41] This approach is more similar to the Western concept of peace-enforcement. Colonel-General Aleksandr Lebed, former commander of the Russian Federation's 14th Army, describes the necessary approach this way: "If a decision is made to use troops, they must be employed decisively, firmly, and without delay. And it must be clear to everyone that a force has arrived capable of putting every insolent, encroaching bandit in his place."[42] While this doctrine allows for the more frequent and heavy-handed use of force, it is not that different from the direction the international community is headed in peace operations such as Kosovo. It allows Russia, a far superior force to those in its near abroad, to come in and force the two sides to reach an agreement. Indeed, Russia has shown great restraint in its use of force in the past. According to US Lieutenant Colonel Tom Wilhelm, in Tajikistan "the Russians had the means of overwhelming force—tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft; they never brought them to bear in any decisive manner, choosing instead to try to secure through consecutive diplomatic summits a peacekeeping force in accordance with internationally-recognized norms and standards."[43] A danger in the approach of using force to separate belligerents is when it is combined with the second criticism of Russian forces—partiality.

2. Partiality: Russia has been accused frequently of showing partiality in a conflict in accordance with the interests of the Russian Federation. In several cases, the Russian government has forced local authorities into compromise to allow the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces or manipulated local groups to obtain settlement terms favorable to

Russian interests.[44] Russia's interests in the near abroad often cause it to take a somewhat less than neutral role in conflicts. However, the US is often considered a partial force in conflicts such as Haiti or Kosovo, and its interests are often a driving factor. While Russia's ultimate goal is almost always to settle the conflict, it also uses the situation to promote its policy interests, as in the case of Abkhazia where it pressured Georgia to join the CIS.[45] At times, Russian forces have played a direct role in some conflicts. They provide weapons to belligerents, carry out punitive strikes against local forces, or perform other actions favoring one side over another.[46] In many regions, even if the Russians acted impartially, it would be difficult for the belligerents to accept them as an impartial force because of their history in the region. This is certainly the case in Georgia, where Russia aided both the Abkhazians and the Georgians at different times during the fighting, making it impossible for the Russians to be regarded as impartial.[47] In several cases, Russian partiality, whether real or perceived, has harmed the peacekeeping mission. However, Russia has often helped its appearance of impartiality by including belligerents in the peacekeeping force.

3. Use of belligerents in peacekeeping forces: In Russian peacekeeping doctrine, direct control of peacekeeping forces in a region is exercised by a joint staff composed of representatives from Russian forces as well as the combatants in the conflict zone.[48] These forces take part in policing the zone of separation and other activities.[49] The UN and NATO do not have any legal agreement on belligerent participation, but it has generally not been a part of traditional peace operations. Including belligerents may put peacekeeping forces at risk of being caught in the middle of renewed fighting, but it also may have the benefit of creating cooperation between the parties, allowing for an eventual opportunity for the third party to slowly withdraw its forces.[50] Russians believe that combatant participation has the potential to build relationships and mechanisms for resolving future conflicts.[51]

CASE STUDIES OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING

Russian peacekeeping forces and doctrine can best be analyzed in terms of their actual participation in peace operations. Looking at the Russian forces in

the light of a multinational operation, Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), provides an opportunity to see how they perform within a UN/NATO framework. This allows an analysis of how their participation in combined peacekeeping efforts, particularly within the NATO structure, can be improved. The case of Russian troops in Bosnia was selected because of the wealth of information available. In addition, the length of the mission allows for more thorough analysis of the case. The second case study looks at the operation in Abkhazia, Georgia, to analyze Russian performance in the near abroad under the CIS aegis in coordination with UN military observers. Since Russia's priority is to maintain stability along its borders, it is more likely to be involved first in operations in its near abroad before involving itself in peacekeeping efforts elsewhere. Abhkazia was selected because of the interaction between CIS forces and UN observers.

These case studies provide the framework for our recommendations to improve combined operations and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in the near abroad.

Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)

On 14 December 1995, the Bosnia Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, after its negotiation in Dayton, Ohio. On 16 December, NATO launched the largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Joint Endeavor. NATO was given a mandate to implement the military aspects of the agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031. Although NATO-led, the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) included 16 non-NATO nations. IFOR was given a one-year mandate and began its operations on 20 December 1995.[52] As a part of IFOR, The Russian Brigade operated as one of the five maneuver brigades under Task Force Eagle, led by an American commander. Its area of responsibility covered 1,750 square kilometers.

Following the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections, IFOR successfully completed its missions. In November/December 1996, NATO foreign and defense ministers concluded that a military presence, although reduced, would be needed in Bosnia. Therefore, NATO created the

Stabilization Force (SFOR, also known as Operation Joint Guard), which was activated 20 December 1996, the date the IFOR mandate expired.

SFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement).[53] SFOR has the same rules of engagement as IFOR, allowing the "robust use of force," as it is necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the forces.[54] SFOR's size is approximately half the size of IFOR, at just under 32,000 troops, including 1,500 Russian airborne troops.

Including the Russians in IFOR

The decision to include Russian forces in the operation in Bosnia was plagued with a number of difficult political and military issues. While both governments felt Russian participation was necessary, overcoming command issues proved troublesome. The possible role of Russian troops ranged from various "special operations" tasks such as engineering, transport, and construction, to full fledged peacekeeping.[55] Eventually it was decided, due to political constraints, that Russian forces, acting in their own area within the US sector, would be placed under American General George Joulwan acting as Commander of US Forces in Europe, not under NATO. Another obstacle involved who maintained operational and tactical control. Operational control refers to the selection of tasks a given unit is assigned, while tactical control refers to the daily orders to do something or go somewhere called for by the operational control tasks. Since the Russians were most concerned with operational control, it would be necessary to develop a solution that allowed the Russians to maintain operational control, while still giving the US commander tactical control. Therefore, the chain of command needed to be redefined by separating tactical and operational control. Russian General Shevtsov and General Joulwan were able to create such a solution by placing the Russian troops under tactical control of the Multi-National Division Commander, in this case an American, while operational control remained in the hands of Russian General Shetsov as General Joulwan's Deputy Commander for Russian Forces.[56]

The ability to resolve these military command and control issues made it possible to avoid a political disaster. This was due in large part to the

defense-to-defense cooperation. In the few years leading up to IFOR, Secretary Perry and Defense Minister Grachev established a working relationship which, when combined with the relationship between General Joulwan and General Shevtsov, made it possible to win support within a critical constituency: the militaries themselves.[57]

Training for Combined Operations in IFOR

Combined troop training is vital for the military and political success of a peacekeeping contingent. Prior to the Dayton Accords, US and Russian troops had engaged in two Field Training Exercises (FTX): Totsk, Russia in 1994, and Ft. Riley, Kansas in 1995. The pre-deployment phase of the train-up began on 17 November 1995. Elements of the Russian force were brought to Germany to participate in the planning process. Russian forces training took place within the parent divisions of the Airborne Troops and was conducted in accordance with the Guidelines for the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces Actions as UN Troops, and the training program for the peacekeeping units of the Airborne Troops.[58]

There was a variety of additional components in the training of the Russian peacekeeping forces devoted to unconventional actions in emergency situations. This included working with professional psychologists in order to determine good psychological compatibility in forming squads and teams. Only personnel with six months in service were selected for the brigade[59] and approximately forty percent of the personnel were combat veterans.[60] Legal training was also strongly emphasized with legal briefings and consultations with international lawyers. This training provided a basis for understanding international legal standards for Russian personnel.

One specific joint training event, the participation of Russian officers in the command post exercise conducted in the 1st Armored Division in Germany, is often noted as an exercise that increased the ability of the two militaries to work together in the multinational operation. During this exercise, Russian officers, in concert with their American counterparts, were able to clarify certain details of the joint tasks and define the situation in the conflict zone in greater detail.[61] Combined peacekeeping force training,

including firing exercises, seminars, and sharing of experiences and lessons learned, has continued throughout the operation, though the amount of training depends on Russia's ability to finance it.

Once IFOR was established, a high level of cooperation continued as the forces were deployed. American and Russian forces worked together in the areas of air and ground logistics. Since both the US and Russia utilize air and rail transportation for the deployment of troops, such coordination is essential and, if handled properly, can help avoid early problems in performing this massive task. A Russian liaison officer in Vicenza, Italy, coordinated air movement. Russian officers also helped to coordinate movement of rail with the Movement Control Center of NATO. These initial actions of coordination in both training and deployment of forces set the stage for a fairly cohesive combined peacekeeping force.

Working with the Russian Brigade

Upon arrival in Bosnia, Major General William Nash, Commander of the US sector (Task Force Eagle), and his Russian counterparts found immediate means to cooperate. Both Russian and US military leaders have been insistent upon developing, planning, and carrying out a robust series of combined exercises within the Bosnian area of operations. Cooperation on the ground is evident as US troops have provided fire support for Russian platoons, while Russian units have served as a covering force for US infantry.[62]

The majority of duties assigned to the forces relate to the show of force, blockades and the armed presence of forces in conflict regions. The most common task of ground forces is patrolling in the area of responsibility. These patrolling missions, consisting of ten to fifteen soldiers, were designed to investigate the areas beyond the limits of control posts in the base areas, demonstrate IFOR/SFOR presence, gather information, and protect freedom of movement. Ground troops are also used in escorting representatives from various international organizations helping to resolve the conflict. In addition to each country doing patrols independently, Russian and US troops also work in combined patrols. The frequency of these patrols ranged from once a week

to once a month. Intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, as well as the majority of intelligence sharing, are planned and conducted in order to support these tasks. However, due to political fallout over the NATO bombing of Serbia, combined patrolling has been halted.

Problems in Working with the Russian Brigade

Although the Russians serve a larger strategic purpose in Bosnia, differences in operating procedures, language, military cultures, and equipment continue to create tension in the working relationship of soldiers in the daily operations of SFOR. At the operational level, the command and control system was often ineffective and inefficient. Operation participants noted that, in the initial format of IFOR (now SFOR), due to the large size of the force and the many participating countries:

> Individual elements of this design must be optimized to emphasize the following: the unique features of multi-national cooperation; the scope and complexity of the MNF missions; the quantity of information and operations documents developed and used for troops; command and control; and troop coordination.[63]

Due to the newly established command structure, military-political tasks were to be carried out upon coordination with the Deputy SACEUR for the Russian Contingent, leaving for discussion whether a significant number of orders were narrow tactical or political-military issues. This problem caused the Russian Brigade to react more slowly to orders and caused friction between the command of the Russian Brigade and higher headquarters, especially on politically sensitive issues. Another reason for slow reaction to headquarters commands arose from the need of the US liaison officers (LNO's) to interpret the tasks for the Russian commander. While American officers are used to generating "implied tasks" from verbal orders, the Russian forces were often confused and spent a great deal of time having the LNO call back and forth to the US Divisional Headquarters in Tuzla, officially the Multinational Division (North)—MND(N), to get the order refined to list each specific item in great detail.[64]

The sharing of intelligence is another often-cited concern. Russian and American military personnel jointly collected, exchanged, and processed intelligence information in their zone of responsibility, thus allowing the sharing of information and experiences between the two forces.[65] The sharing of such information between groups allowed both groups to become more aware of events in the sector without duplication of effort. Currently, the sharing of intelligence between US and Russian forces has decreased due to mistrust developed during NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.[66]

Before the deployment of IFOR/SFOR, many politicians and military commanders doubted the ability of the Russian troops to remain impartial in Bosnia due to the Russian reputation in peacekeeping activities elsewhere. Measures were taken to ensure the impartiality of the Russian contingent by placing one of the Russian battalions in Serb territory and the other in the Muslim region.[67] To many that worked with the Russians, they were considered to be just as impartial to the warring factions as any part of Task Force Eagle. General Nash points out that during an incident in the Russian area of responsibility where Bosnian Serbs were behaving provocatively, the Russians were "even-handed in their approach, treated all parties with dignity and respect, and were firm in pursuit of their assigned mission."[68] General Nash further explained in an interview that Russian troops treated Serbs with the same distrust as the other military forces, as almost no one trusted any of the warring factions.[69] On the other hand, many US officers interviewed responded negatively when asked about the impartiality of the Russian peacekeepers. The presence of Russians, according to one Colonel who served in Bosnia as a troop commander, provided a safe haven for the violation of the Dayton Peace Accords by harboring Serb criminals.[70] However, the Balkan Task Force has seen no overt reporting of Russian partiality and maintains that it is often difficult to find reports that are completely truthful and reliable.[71]

There is also concern over the Russian procedures for performing inspections of weapons storage sites within its area of responsibility within US-led MND (N). In discussing US-Russian cooperation with US military

officers who have participated in SFOR, many expressed their concern over the lack of inspections done by the Russian Brigade. Evidently, there was little value placed on this action by the Russian brigade. In fact, the US soldiers often performed the inspections within the Russian area of responsibility.[72] However, one LNO pointed out that while some officers feel that Russians are not executing up to standard, they are executing to their own standard, which is no better or worse.[73]

The overall level of professionalism of Russian members has also been questioned. A number of officers responded with instances of high levels of alcohol abuse by Russian soldiers and the creation of a brothel in the Russian area of responsibility.[74] However, as Colonel Kaufmann, commander of the Balkan Task Force, points out, while these types of instances are harmful to the overall peacekeeping mission of SFOR, they are not uncommon in any multinational operation, even with other NATO countries.[75]

The Russians also reportedly had problems with their equipment and maintenance. The US provided some of the necessary communication devices for the Russian Brigade since they did not own or operate any communications devices that were compatible with the US system. However, the US provided similar equipment to all of the participating forces operating in the US sector.[76] The Russian Brigade also suffered further problems with equipment, especially vehicles, which were old and unusable for operations because the Russians did not have the necessary maintenance upkeep.[77] This not only meant that the Russian Brigade would be slower to respond, but also that the US commander would often have to compensate in other ways. Problems with the poor quality and short range of the Russian radios caused difficulties in their ability to communicate and report quickly to MND (N). US forces were unable to pick up a phone or radio and speak with the person they were trying to contact from the Russian contingent. This caused a great deal of frustration for the US forces, who were used to instantaneous communication.

The language barrier was, and continues to be, one of the biggest problems between the Russian Brigade and US forces. Since communication is paramount to combined missions, the language barrier can have a large

impact on the effectiveness of the combined force. Currently, US liaison officers receive approximately eighteen months of language training, but some are put into liaison positions before their training is complete.[78] Upon their arrival to SFOR, LNO's live and work with the Russian Brigade. However, for those who did not receive this amount of training, communicating and establishing rapport with the Russians is more difficult.

Overall, the working relationship in SFOR between the US command of the US-led MND (N) and the Russian Brigade has been cooperative and effective since it began in 1995. Although there are still issues of concern that cause friction between the two forces, they are not crucial to the overall effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

Lessons Learned in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)

Lesson 1: Russia and the US can work together under NATO and with the international community. Having Russian forces under a US commander five years after the Cold War ended was an unexpected event. After conducting the two major peace operation exercises and their experience in IFOR/SFOR, the two forces have learned more about each other's operating procedures. In the course of conducting operations, Russian and US troops expanded their military cooperation, including joint combined-arms training. They were able to develop unified procedures and standards, as well as increase tactical-level liaison, thus increasing both coordination and security.[79] Numerous mine locating and clearing activities were performed together, especially since there were an estimated 1000 mine fields located in the Russian sector alone.[80] Coordination also occurred in places where the warring parties might use toxic substances. Working contacts were set up between the Russian and American CBR (chemical-biological-radiological) defense services, including periodic environmental checks at the permanent base camps and smaller units. These examples demonstrate just a few of the many instances of successful coordination between the two forces.

Lesson 2: Once there is a political will expressed and the US Secretary of Defense and Russian Minister of Defense sign the agreement that lays out the terms of the mission, the militaries must be able to execute plans

as they see necessary. Both US and Russian troops have been able to conduct a number of integrated operations to resolve military aspects not specifically addressed in the accords. A study conducted by the Foreign Military Studies Office discussing the Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia, indicates that, "in the overall opinion of the operation participants, the partnership of NATO and Russia in Bosnia symbolized the obligation that the world community had taken itself to end the war there."[81] Generals Joulwan and Shevtsov were able to overcome issues of command and the forces in Bosnia have been able to conduct a successful combined peacekeeping operation. The relationship between the two forces suffers greatly when forced apart by politics at higher levels.

Lesson 3: A successful operation requires a common strategic objective and the professionalism of soldiers. Despite different national interests and a competitiveness in pursuing those interests in the region, the mission of effective peacekeeping requires a high level of coordination and cooperation between the American and Russian forces. Regardless of the various cultural and military differences, the two groups were most often able to present and act as a unified force, showing the Bosnians that a soldier is a soldier, no matter what uniform he or she wears.

Lesson 4: Russian and American soldiers are in agreement on a number of issues vital to the peacekeeping effort. In a survey of US and Russian officers conducted by a joint US-Russian research team,[82] there was a broad area of professional consensus among both populations. Both groups agreed that the success of multinational peace operations depends on how carefully such operations are prepared and both emphasized the need for continued attention to operational planning, organizing supply and logistics, and maintaining coordination in order to secure success. Both groups of officers also supported, although to a differing degree, the need to improve coordination between commands and staffs and among the various national military contingents and with civilian agencies.[83] Improved training and support for training for civil affairs to enhance cooperation was given a high priority.[84] The survey revealed that both groups oppose having the OSCE

assume responsibility for conducting multinational peace operations and felt that multinational peace operations should not be entrusted to the military of a single nation, nor should the multinational staffing be extended down to brigade-battalion level.

These results highlight the fact that the two militaries agree on a number of important issues affecting their performance as peacekeeping forces. However, the areas of disagreement, especially those concerning strategic and operational command and control of multinational peacekeeping forces, illustrate the need to engage in US-Russian and NATO-Russian dialogue on the issue of future command arrangements for these operations. As this cooperation and teamwork becomes the norm in Bosnia, future operations will benefit from the lessons learned in IFOR/SFOR.

Lesson 5: Developing and maintaining working relationships between US and Russian leaders, especially the US Secretary of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense and other top military leaders, makes a significant difference in combined peacekeeping operations. The success of IFOR/SFOR is due in large part to the hard work and personal interest in building relationships between Secretary Perry, Minister Grachev, General Joulwan, General Shevtsov, and many others. Their ability to develop a partnership between the two militaries and work out issues of concern to both sides proved invaluable to the success of IFOR/SFOR. Had there not been such a desire to work together, Russia would not have participated and SFOR may not have achieved the same level of success it has as of this writing.

Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG)

While the conflict in Abkhazia had been building since 1989, it began in earnest in early 1992, when the Abkhaz minority (17 percent of the population, about 93,000 people) began pressing for complete independence from Georgia after nationalist rhetoric from the Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia encouraged them to seek greater autonomy.[85] Georgian forces stormed the Abkhaz capital city, Sukhumi, in July 1992, claiming their purpose was to restore order.[86] Fighting then broke out between the two sides in August 1992. During that portion of the conflict, the Russian military aided the Abkhaz side

by providing equipment and expertise, although it is unclear whether the military was acting independently or following orders from Moscow.[87] At that point the Georgian military was more of a renegade band of local clan leaders than a professional fighting force.[88] From August 1992 to October 1993 the Russian government brokered three cease-fire agreements, all of which were subsequently breached. The breaking of the third agreement highlights the convoluted involvement of Russian forces.

On 27 July 1993 the third agreement was reached, which provided for disarmament, withdrawal of Georgian troops, and restoration of the legitimate government to Sukhumi but made no decision as to the political status of Abkhazia.[89] Neither the Georgians nor the Abkhaz disarmed, and Abkhazia attacked Sukhumi in September 1993, when Georgia was vulnerable because they were embroiled in a conflict in South Ossetia. At the same time, Russia was in the midst of a constitutional crisis, making it difficult for Russian troops to receive clear direction from Moscow. The Abkhaz offensive used military equipment the Russians had supposedly rendered useless.[90] The Russians gave at least tacit assent to the Abkhaz and are alleged to have provided aircraft and other heavy equipment for the offensive.[91] During this offensive, the Abkhaz were able to take control of all of Abkhazia. Only at that point did the Russians threaten the Abkhaz with economic sanctions in order to broker a cease-fire. If Russia's government had not been in turmoil at the time, perhaps they would have acted more quickly and decisively, as Georgian President Shevardnadze claims, "If the events of the third and fourth of October [referring to the crisis in Moscow] had happened earlier, then Sukhumi would not have fallen."[92]

The fourth cease-fire agreement, reached in Moscow in 1994, has held to date. The situation remains volatile, with frequent clashes between paramilitary groups and acts of terrorism and sabotage committed by criminal organizations and paramilitary groups. Most of these paramilitary groups are semi-organized Georgian freedom fighters trying to regain the territory claimed by the Abkhaz in the final conflict before the Moscow Agreement. No agreement has been reached on the political status of Abkhazia or the

repatriation of the 300,000 Georgian refugees driven from the region during the conflict.[93] Since the cease-fire, Abkhazia has held "presidential elections" and established its own constitution, further exacerbating differences on its political status, and Georgian paramilitary groups heighten tensions through frequent disturbances in the security zone.[94] At present, attempts to achieve a political solution have produced only limited success.

The UN maintains 101 military observers in the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The UN's mandate is to "(a) monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994; (b) to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement; (c) to verify through observation and patrolling that troops of the parties did not remain in or re-enter the security zone and heavy military equipment did not remain or was not reintroduced in the security zone or restricted weapons zone;" and several other stipulations to ensure compliance with the agreement and the return of refugees.[95]

Under the aegis of the CIS, Russia maintains about 1,500 forces in the region, although the authorization calls for the presence of 3,000 troops. The Russians have frequently called for the support of other CIS nations, but none have responded. At the CIS meeting in which the Moscow Agreement was concluded, the other CIS nations agreed to return to their respective governments and request troops for the operation. However, each government responded negatively to the request. This is due to the poor condition of many of the CIS countries' militaries and economies, their desire not to be involved with a Russian-dominated force at least perceived to be partial, and the tension between these governments and Russia. The Ukraine and several other CIS nations have only been willing to send observers to the UN observer mission, not troops to the CIS peacekeeping force.

According to UNOMIG official Wolfgang Weber, the UN mandate is sound and does not over-stretch UN capabilities as in some other peacekeeping missions. The Russian/CIS forces maintain a stable environment for the political settlement to be worked out, or, at the very least,

keep armed conflicts to a minimum. Weber says that the UN and Russian/CIS forces work together successfully and the Russian troops are relatively well disciplined, equipped, and fed. However, the former Russian commander in Georgia, General Bobkin, claims that the force is not large enough or adequately equipped to take on a more ambitious mission of policing throughout Abkhazia and ensuring the safe return of refugees.[96] To perform that mission, he claims, would require eight to ten thousand troops.[97] Although the effectiveness of Russian forces is in question, Weber believes that without continued Russian presence, or the presence of an equally capable UN force, fighting would resume almost immediately.

UN forces perform regular patrols, man checkpoints, conduct regular weapons inspections, and monitor the performance of Russian/CIS forces. UN actions are limited by the size of the force and the security risks of being unarmed in an unstable environment. Weber believes that the fact that the UN troops are unarmed improves the impression of impartiality, though at times there have been security problems. One such problem in which seven UN members were taken hostage by a criminal group on 13 October 1999 caused the US to recall its military observers to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital,[98] where they remain to date in accordance with US policy. Because of this and other incidents, the UN attempted to introduce a UN protection force in 1998. However, Russia struck down the proposal at the UNSC, claiming that the Russian/CIS forces were acting as a protection force for the UN and thus the introduction of 300 additional UN troops was unnecessary. Russia has been extremely suspicious of any attempts to get them out of Georgia, fearing NATO or US attempts to increase their influence in Russia's backyard. As an alternative to the UN Protection Force, the UN has augmented its staff with 17 international and 34 locally-hired security personnel. The lack of security for UN troops has forced them to close several team bases situated in isolated locations and has forced them to conduct only limited patrolling, leaving their mission only partially fulfilled. In particular, the US observers cannot perform their part in the mission adequately while being forced to remain in Tbilisi for security reasons.

The UN task of monitoring the Russian/CIS peacekeepers has proved delicate because the Russian forces are also the only protection the UN members have from the warring factions. Regular UN-Russian troop exercises are conducted to maintain a high degree of readiness for security back up, and information of mutual interest is frequently exchanged.[99] The UN has actively encouraged Russia to perform more extensive mobile patrols and to be proactive in ensuring the dismantling of the military positions of both sides, which Russia has done to some degree. The UN would still like to see additional Russian and combined Russian-UN patrols, and has often coordinated with the Russians in performing minesweeping operations or in doing patrols in mine-laden areas. However, security concerns of both the UN, who does not want to be perceived as partial by doing patrols with the Russians, and Russia, often a target of partisan groups, have caused both forces to take more limited actions. Therefore, both are not completely fulfilling the mandate to secure the area, facilitate the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's), and ensure that no heavy weapons are brought into the restricted weapons zone.[100]

UNOMIG has had only limited success in ensuring the implementation of the stipulations of the cease-fire agreement. The main obligations in the agreements on the separation of forces made in Tbilisi on 25 June 1999 have been fulfilled.[101] The number of skirmishes on both sides of the cease-fire line has also decreased.[102] A system of joint investigations with the UN, Russia, and both parties to the conflict, has been set up to investigate violent incidents, with thirteen successful investigations already complete. However, a number of the key aspects of an eventual resolution have not been resolved. The return of refugees to Abkhazia, the political status of Abkhazia, and the establishment of a more secure environment will be necessary before a more permanent resolution can be achieved.

The 1,500-man Russian/CIS peacekeeping force has received recognition from a UN mandate for its role in maintaining security in the region in accordance with the 1994 Moscow Agreement. The UN mandate has provided some much-desired legitimacy for the Russians, although they

have been unable to secure any UN funding for the operation. The US and other nations have been skeptical of providing any further legitimacy to the Russian force because of its alleged partiality and questionable performance.

Major Owen Cheney, US Army officer and UN Military Observer in Georgia, evaluates the Russian performance as a successful effort at completing the minimum task of keeping people from fighting.[103] They have performed reasonably well at maintaining security in an extremely volatile region. UN requests of Russia are generally followed, though they are usually limited only to what the UN knows Russia is willing to perform. Russia's first priority is force protection. Russian troops sometimes suffer equipment shortages or maintenance problems, several incidents due to Russian soldiers selling fuel on the black market, and have occasional discipline problems. Maintenance problems often result in valuable equipment eventually becoming unusable.

According to Weber, the primary drawback of the Russian/CIS peacekeeping force is Russia's strong political interest in the region, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to be neutral. Russian forces are perceived as too dominating and party to the conflict, often making them a target for both sides at various times during the fighting. This limits the Russian forces' ability to perform routine patrols for fear of the safety of their troops. At present, they are only able to man checkpoints and maintain large clusters of forces to provide a separation between the two sides. According to Cheney,

> The CIS (Russian) Peacekeeping Force (PKF) continues to be unable or unwilling to fulfill its mandated tasks. In particular, Russian inactivity in patrolling and delays in expanding its AOR [Area of Responsibility] to include both the security zone (SZ) and restricted weapons zone (RWZ) have failed to create security conditions conducive to the return of internally displaced persons (IDP's) to their pre-war homes. The CIS PKF appears content to maintain the pre-May [1998] fighting status quo in the SZ and conduct operations to support only those CIS mandated tasks which minimize the threat to their own forces in the conflict zone. After the recent fighting in May,

> the Russian PKF appears to be taking a more active role in Gali with increased patrolling and establishment of new checkpoints. However, these actions are more likely linked to the PKF command's desire to minimize casualties than to fulfill its mandated tasks.[104]

The Russian peacekeeping forces on the ground argue that they need a more robust force to completely fulfill these mandates, but such a force remains unlikely in the foreseeable future.

In addition to its inability to fulfill its mandate, Russia has frequently come into question for its partiality to the Abkhaz. According to Etery Astemirova, Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, there are specific accounts of "peacekeepers detaining citizens and handing them over to Abkhaz authorities who then jailed, beat, and tortured them; threatening and robbing citizens at gunpoint, sometimes claiming to be collecting 'pay' for protecting Georgian interests; providing cover for Abkhaz paramilitaries conducting punitive combat operations; and even killing individual citizens."[105] Though these allegations are disturbing, Weber believes that in recent times the impression of the Russians as partisan has slightly decreased and their leadership is better at ensuring disciplined and professional performance.[106]

Russian involvement provides a more secure environment and maintains the status quo but does little to provide for a more lasting peace. The military forces are inadequate for a more ambitious mission, and the political will, both in Russia and internationally, has not been sufficiently committed to resolving the conflict. The Abkhaz, bolstered by the Russian presence, have little incentive to negotiate a solution. The Russians have no desire to leave and thus lose their influence in the region. Until a concerted political effort is made to find a solution, the status quo will remain indefinitely, with its high costs to Georgia, Russia, and the UN.

Lessons Learned in Abkhazia

Lesson 1: The US should expect Russian involvement in operations in Russia's near abroad. The Russians will be heavily engaged in the near abroad, promoting their interests and often times acting as a partial force or a

domineering parent controlling its children. Russia spends over $526,000 per month maintaining forces in Abkhazia, placing a difficult burden on the Ministry of Defense.[107] Despite this high economic cost and the political pressure from Georgia for the Russians to leave, Russia has continued and will continue to maintain its presence in keeping with its interests. Any solution to the situation in Georgia or elsewhere in the near abroad must therefore include Russian participation.

Lesson 2: Russia's forces are adequate for maintaining peace and stability, but greater political effort is required to broker a more comprehensive peace settlement. The Russian forces in Abkhazia prevent a re-escalation of the conflict, but many observers claim that until Russian forces leave, Abkhazia has no incentive to reach an agreement on either its status within the sovereignty of Georgia or the return of refugees, thus preventing a resolution. The problems of Russian partiality and heavy-handedness encourage the continuation of the status quo. Russian troops can maintain because of superior force and the threat of even greater force, but if a resolution is not in Russian interests, it will not happen.

Lesson 3: Russian/CIS and UN forces need to improve cooperation and coordination. The situation in Abkhazia is extremely unstable and any small conflict has the potential to incite a larger one. The UN and Russia must coordinate to make sure all required areas are watched and adequate patrols are performed so that they do not miss a build-up of troops or minor altercation that may lead to a larger conflict. The UN cannot perform all these missions without Russian protection, and Russian forces are unlikely to perform many of them on their own. In addition, many of the missions that might facilitate a political solution, such as the return of the IDP's, can only be performed through joint efforts. One positive example of this is the UN's recent success in setting up a joint investigating team with Russia and the warring parties to investigate terrorist or criminal incidents in the region. However, only a small number of incidents have been investigated. The Coordination Council, a forum for the four parties to discuss implementation of the agreement, has had minimal success and has often stalled in the

negotiation process. The UN and Russia do little to coordinate activities except when the UN requires protection to accomplish an activity.

Lesson 4: Any apparent pressure to replace the Russian mission with UN or other international troops will be met with fierce Russian resistance. Russia believes that the CIS peacekeeping force is a legitimate force that should receive full UN recognition and funds. UN protection forces will continue to be vetoed in the UNSC. While Russia theoretically approves of using the UN and OSCE as peacekeeping bodies, they have resisted most efforts to use them in the Russian near abroad. Anything that they perceive as Western encroachment into their sphere of influence will meet with strong resistance.

The Future of Russian Peacekeeping

After looking at Russia's interests, political environment, peacekeeping forces, doctrine, and case studies from combined operations in Bosnia and CIS operations in Abkhazia, it is possible to draw several conclusions about where and how Russia is likely to involve itself in future peacekeeping operations. According to Russian President Putin, territorial integrity and domestic order are his top priorities.[108] Conflicts on Russia's borders, most likely to occur in the near abroad, will take precedence among Russia's peacekeeping missions because of the potential they have for destabilizing areas within Russian territory and because of Russia's desire to maintain its sphere of influence in the near abroad. Outside this region, however, Russian peacekeeping will not take a high priority for the next several years. Russia still fears a weakening of its influence in the world, and thus will remain engaged with NATO in the Balkans and, to a certain extent, with UN missions, but its resources will be much more limited for such endeavors.

In the near abroad, Russia will prefer to work under the aegis of the CIS while striving to receive a UN mandate and funding for its operations. It will most likely be unwilling to sacrifice control of the operation for a full UN mandate and funding,[109] but will continue to request funds and troops from other CIS states. Despite the high costs of involvement, Russia will continue to get involved in conflicts in the near abroad to protect its interests and

maintain influence in the region. At the same time, it will seek to keep the US, and especially NATO, out of its sphere of influence.

Russia will maintain its commitment to the Balkans out of pride and a desire to protect its interests in the area. Russia desires to remain an important player in the world arena. However, the military may seek to reduce the level of commitment because of financial constraints and the high level of operations they have had to sustain. As Putin announced, they will continue to work with NATO,[110] desiring a more equal voice in the operation. Despite this desire, the military is unlikely to devote many of its scarce resources to conform its equipment and procedures to NATO standards of operation. They will continue to put pressure on the US and other NATO countries to work through the OSCE and the UN as a conflict resolution body, rather than performing operations outside the purview of the UN.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the future of Russian peacekeeping in mind, this section recommends actions to be taken to improve combined operations in Bosnia and to support Russian operations in Abkhazia, with consideration given to those actions most likely to improve the US-Russian strategic relationship. The final portion of this section looks at the more robust options that are effective in both spheres and can be used in future operations to build and maintain a cooperative relationship.

Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations

Most of the combined operations problems in US-Russian relations stem from a lack of understanding or communication between the two militaries. This gap exists on every level of the relationship, from the highest levels of the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to interactions between individual soldiers. Therefore, the following recommendations have been divided at various levels to address such issues.

Operational Level Recommendations

Problem: Misunderstandings of military-political tasks between the Russian Brigade and MND(N) headquarters causing difficulties in their abilities to respond to tactical orders.[111] US commanders are accustomed to

verbal orders. However, the Russians would prefer to have all tasks published in the form of Implementation Instructions (IMPIN's) before they act. In addition, the Russians interpret some tasks as political-military tasks, not solely military tasks. Therefore, they must get permission through the Russian chain of command, which is time consuming.[112]

Recommendation: Increase the number of liaison officers to the Russian Brigade to five or six, three or four with the Russian Brigade and two in Tuzla. Currently, there are three LNO's stationed with the Russian Brigade at the Russian Headquarters in Ugljevik and one working at the US division Headquarters in Tuzla. Their job is to maintain connectivity between the Russian Brigade and MND(N) HQ by serving as translator and interpreter between the two headquarters. Additional LNO's would be tasked with jobs similar to those currently in service. LNO's are indispensable to the operation for translating and offering professional opinions to the Russian Brigade. Civilian translators are not able to translate the military concepts and do not have the same level of experience as LNO's.

Moreover, a Russian Representative should be included in PfP command post exercises. During these command post exercises, focus should be placed on coordinating staff organizations and developing practical recommendations on the use of military force and on the basic premises for assessing the effectiveness of its use. A mobile staff made up of US and Russian officers should be created from these exercises to work issues in case of necessary emergency deployments to conflict regions. Russian officers can provide experience from their peacekeeping operations (with the CIS, NATO, or the UN) that may be helpful in dealing with combined peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, they will be able to troubleshoot possible operational problems concerning Russian units in combined operations, such as the difficulty of understanding "implied tasks" assigned by MND(N).

Tactical Level Recommendations

Problem: Lack of professionalism and partiality shown on the part of the Russian soldiers, as well as differences in military culture and a lack of coordination.

Recommendation: Restart combined patrolling missions with US and Russian forces. Continual reevaluation of NATO and other participating countries' actions towards the former warring parties shows that it was not always completely balanced.[113] Currently, the US and Russian forces do not perform any combined patrolling missions due to political fallout during the summer of 1999.[114] Before this, the Russians and Americans did approximately six combined patrols per month, three in the American sector, and three in the Russian area of responsibility with one LNO present with the patrol to facilitate the mission and communication. Combined patrols help the relationship in two ways: they serve as a way to present a unified front to the people in Bosnia who were hoping to drive a wedge between the two forces, and they allow the soldiers to learn more about each other. One LNO called the combined patrols the biggest "money-maker for US-Russian military relations."[115] Additionally, Set aside more time to brief incoming American commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCOs) on various differences in military culture, terminology, procedures, etc. This can be done by the Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) in the area that have served with the Russian Brigade, if available.

Problem: Language barriers affect all levels of operations. Typically only the LNO's speak any amount of Russian, and few Russians speak English. This problem has been recognized as one of the biggest issues that continues to cause difficulties in combined operations.

Recommendation: DoD should ensure that liaison officers receive adequate training in the necessary language. Also, DoD should develop phrase books that provide essential information on carrying out common or shared tasks in both Russian and English. Captain Leyde, a current LNO in SFOR commented that "a LNO who arrives with a high proficiency in Russian has a much easier time establishing rapport and proving his professional competency."[116] The current Air Staff emphasis on raising Air Force language abilities among officers to 10 percent is thus rightly justified. Other branches of service should set and achieve similar goals.

Recommendations for US Support for Peacekeeping in Abkhazia and the Near-Abroad

With US interests in mind, this section looks at how the US can improve the US-Russian strategic relationship through supporting Russia in performing its peacekeeping functions in the near abroad. The analysis lists several of the problems in Abkhazia and gives recommendations for solving or improving them that provide the best combination of positive impact on the situation and on the US-Russian relationship.

Problem: The UN Observers are not able to completely fulfill their mandate due to travel restriction and security concerns. The UN observers, because they are unarmed, have become targets of criminal groups and partisan forces. The limitations on UN observers allow for a more unstable environment because the observers cannot ensure the guidelines for restricted weapons' zones are completely followed or that there is not a build-up of troops preparing for an attack in certain areas of the security zone.

Recommendation: Allow US UNOMIG observers more freedom to travel to certain areas within the conflict regions and increase the number of US observers from two to five. The US troops can only perform their mission if they are able to more directly view the conflict zone. The UN observers have taken adequate precautions to protect their troops while still performing the mission. US troops should not show a lack of commitment to the region by being unwilling to perform the tasks that the rest of the observers perform. While the DoD may deem it necessary to restrict them from isolated regions because of security concerns, they should at least be allowed to visit Sukhumi, where Russian/CIS and UN headquarters are located, as well as the more protected areas around Zugdidi and Gali.

Many in the UN and Russia see a lack of US commitment because of their unwillingness to bear the same risks as the other UN observers. Lifting the restriction and increasing the number of observers will show more support for the UN mission and will enable the US observers to better monitor the belligerents' compliance with the mandate and the performance of Russian/CIS forces. By remaining in Tbilisi, US observers give the Abkhaz

the impression that the US is partial to the Georgians, decreasing Abkhaz trust in US efforts to resolve the crisis. Increasing the number of observers and allowing them to interact with the Russian/CIS forces will improve the familiarity with and understanding of the Russian military. If the US is unwilling to allow its observers to actually observe the conflict, their presence hurts UN and Russian perceptions of US troops because it highlights the fact that US presence is more for political purposes than an actual sign of commitment.

The DoD must necessarily be concerned with the security risks to its personnel. Another hostage crisis, if it involved an American, could be much more serious than the previous incident where seven UN observers were taken hostage by a criminal group and later released unharmed.[117] None of the UN observers have been seriously harmed to date, and the UN has taken precautions to improve security by limiting patrols and not manning checkpoints in isolated locations. The UN has also increased security by hiring armed guards from both within and outside the region, which should help to convince the DoD to loosen restrictions on its observers.[118]

Problem: The Russian/CIS Forces are not able to completely fulfill their mandate and sometimes act (or are perceived to act) with partiality to the Abkhaz.

Recommendation: Increase US UNOMIG observers' interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US observers should increase the amount of time spent with Russian forces to improve the relationship and assess what areas the UN and/or US might be able to provide help either through education and training in necessary subjects, encouragement to undertake certain activities, or logistical support for operations. In the future, the US may be able to use that knowledge in offering education and training in facilitating the return of IDP's and policing the conflict zone, though the US has its own difficulties with this. In addition, by understanding the weaknesses of the Russian peacekeepers, US observers may be able to interact with the Russians to develop solutions for fulfilling the mandate and moving towards a resolution of the conflict.

Additionally, the US should encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to take a more active role in CIS peacekeeping missions. Both politically and militarily, the US can support these nations in an effort to make the CIS an organization less dominated by Russia and more capable in its peacekeeping efforts. The US should give political encouragement for these nations to provide troops for the operations. In addition, the DoD can provide increased funding through the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative to improve facilities, equipment, and training for CIS countries, including Russia. In 1999, the US spent $1million through EIPC on the Ukraine's peacekeeping capabilities. This funding could also be given to Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other CIS states. Outside of EIPC, whose mission is to "increase and improve the pool of capable peacekeepers,"[119] the US can also support countries like the Ukraine and Azerbaijan with funds for participation in peacekeeping activities in the near abroad. This would cost in the range of $3-5 million per year per country.

Overall Recommendations to Improve US-Russian Relations through Peacekeeping

Recommendation 1: Define the circle of participants in the operational planning of multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their participation. While the involvement of non-NATO countries in the policy planning stages of an operation would only create additional congestion and cause the policy planning to be more difficult than it currently is, NATO should look to include all participants in the operational planning of missions. Although the inclusion of Russia in the planning of combined peacekeeping operations like IFOR and KFOR involves changing NATO policy and not solely US policy, it would be beneficial for the US to ask for the inclusion of Russia in the operational planning process.

During the planning for IFOR and KFOR, there was a lack of coordination and involvement with Russia on a political and operational level regarding its participation in the joint peacekeeping missions. This lack of coordination and planning for IFOR was one of the top concerns expressed by

the Russian military once they were established in Bosnia.[120] In the future, greater Russian participation in the planning of operations can reduce their overall concern in becoming a part of a multinational peacekeeping force. By enlarging the planning circle, Russia and other participating countries gain a vested interest in the Peacekeeping operation and this allows contributing countries to express and work through areas of concern before the commencement of the mission. In addition, working together to plan the operation facilitates the development of relationships at a higher level of political and military structure. Evidence suggests that such combined planning is very important in the success of IFOR/SFOR implementation.

The planning structure will depend greatly on how the multinational force is structured. If it is a NATO force, the NATO allies will be hesitant to include Russia in operational planning because of concerns about sharing intelligence.[121] Including non-NATO countries in combined peacekeeping efforts is an ad-hoc process that requires extensive planning and coordination each time it occurs. Although the inclusion of Russia in IFOR was difficult, it was not nearly as complicated as the more formal Helsinki Agreement reached during summer 1999 before the introduction of Russian forces to KFOR. Formal political agreements require a considerable amount of political and military effort to find solutions to both Russian and American concerns. In addition, certain members of NATO prefer little Russian involvement and do not want to provide Russia with any form of veto power in the planning process. There is already an opportunity for Russia to voice its opinions through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or the Permanent Joint Council. NATO is obligated to respond to such concerns and either justify the action or make a change in the planning. However, because of Russia's large contribution to the peacekeeping effort, it should be given more opportunity to provide input than simply reviewing the final operational plan and commenting on it. All non-NATO participants who make significant contributions to the peacekeeping effort and whose forces will be used in the operation should be given a larger voice in the operational planning.

Recommendation 2: Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel. Educational exchange programs and funding are already established for Russian officers to the US in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. The current funding for Russia in FY00 is $900,000, which includes the tuition costs, travel expenses, supplemental living allowances, and medical expenses of students.[122] However, Russia suspended its participation in IMET programs after summer 1999. Russia should reestablish its participation in those courses.[123] In addition to Russian participation in American courses, US Army officers should be sent to the Vystrel Academy in Russia, which teaches peacekeeping courses.[124] The Academy has made offers to accept international students, but the US has not sent its officers to the program for several years.

Recommendation 3: *Perform combined exercises for staff level officers under the established PfP program.* Exercises should include the active participation of Russian staff level officers in the planning and implementation of peace operations. Combined exercises in the early 1990's are credited for making the inclusion of Russia into IFOR possible.

Recommendation 4: Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US Foreign Area Officers. Already suggested above, we want to emphasize again that working together in peacekeeping and on other transnational issues requires an ability to communicate. The military should allow FAO's to receive language training earlier. FAO's are often not given language training and designated as FAO's until their 6th or 7th year of service, when they are often near age 30. To become truly fluent, language training needs to occur earlier in their careers. In addition, the military should ensure that FAO's are not put in liaison positions before they have received adequate training. According to Captain Leyde, those US officers who have not received enough training and are not proficient in the Russian language have a difficult time establishing a good rapport with the Russian military.[125]

Recommendation 5: Increase cultural training for officers and NCO's assigned to work with Russian units. US officers sent to the Balkans receive training in understanding the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats, but not necessarily

their fellow Russian peacekeepers. US officers and NCO's sent to work with Russian units should be taught the cultural differences as well as the differences in the way Russian military units operate. This does not have to be an extensive training program, but could be done by Russian FAOs in a day's training during mission preparation for a mission in Bosnia, Kosovo, or in any future US-Russian combined operations.

Recommendation 6: Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of improved performance in desired areas.

When Russia successfully undertakes an activity with the encouragement or approval of the US, the US should give them credit in the international arena for their actions. The Russian forces have performed reasonably well in areas such as Moldova and South Ossetia, and they should be given credit for it.[126] In situations like Abkhazia, the US should recognize positive steps Russia takes toward facilitating the return of IDPs and accomplishing other tasks that provide for a more lasting solution. Russia has frequently expressed its desire for international recognition for its significant efforts to stabilize the near abroad. In fact, recognition seems just as important to the Russians as receiving funds for their operations.[127]

SUMMARY

Peacekeeping operations provide an excellent opportunity for the US and Russia to improve their strategic relationship. While the US should be careful not to exaggerate the impact this cooperation can have on the relationship, it should commit itself to making the best possible strategic use of peacekeeping cooperation and providing the necessary resources to accomplish that goal. This paper has provided several recommendations for improving US-Russian relations through these peacekeeping operations. By making efforts to improve the relationship now, the Bush administration can alleviate misunderstandings and pave the way for future cooperation with Russia.

ENDNOTES

[1] The *near abroad* refers to the former Soviet states surrounding the Russian Federation.

[2] Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventative Defense* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), 15.

[3] "Russia-NATO Founding Act," online at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm, para 5 (Accessed 4 January 00).

[4] Martin Nesirky, "NATO and Russia aim to improve relations," *Boston Globe*, 17 February 2000, World Section, A20.

[5] Interview with Major General William Nash, US Army, Commander of Task Force Eagle, 3 December 1999.

[6] Interview with Colonel Greg Kaufmann, US Army, Director of the Balkans Task Force, OSD, 20 January 2000.

[7] "Russian Federation National Security Concept," 11 Nov 1996, 5. Approved by the members of the RF Security Council on 5 October 1996.

[8] Micheal Croft, *Russia's Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in Approach and Obstacles*, (Peacekeeping and International Relations, Ottawa, Sept/Oct 1996), 34.

[9] Ibid, 34.

[10] Lieutenant General Anatoly Meleshkov, Representative of the RF Armed Forces to the UN Military Staff Committee, 25 January 2000.

[11] See Abkhazia case study for further discussion of this issue.

[12] Russian National Security Concept.

[13] Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

[14] Dominic Evans, "Putin: If treated fairly, Russia could join NATO," *Reuters,* 6 March 2000.

[15] Russian National Security Concept.

[16] Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Military, Usually Silent, Urges Hard Line on Chechnya," *New York Times*, 7 November 1999, International Section.

[17] Ibid.

[18] John Thornhill and John Lloyd, "Yeltin's Balkan Question," *Financial Times*, 14 June 1999, Comment and Analysis Section, 24.

[19] "Yeltsin's Fast Breaking Generals," *Time*, 28 June 1999, World Section.

[20] Interview with Col Kaufmann

[21] Stuart D. Goldman, "Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?" *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 4 September 1997), Table 1.

[23] Nikolia Novichkov, "Russian Defense Budget Eaten up by Huge Debts," *Jane's Information Group*, June 1999, 25.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Information on Vystrel and other information about the training of their forces comes from the interview with Gen Meleshkov.

[26] Interview with General John Reppert, US Army (retired), former Defense Attache to Russia, November 1999.

[27] Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

[28] James Yentz, "Peace Operations as Reaction to the New World Disorder: Russian and Ukrainian Approaches," unpublished paper, 14 December 1998.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

[32] Colonel Vladimir I. Krysenko, "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping and the Participation of Russian Armed Forces in Areas of Armed Conflict on the Territory of the CIS and Russia." Unpublished text of an oral presentation given at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference in December 1993, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, online at http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/peace.htm (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

[33] Kevin O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia," *Occasional Paper #23*, Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1995, 29.

[34] Interview with Col Kaufmann.

[35] A. Raevsky and I.N. Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR/94/31), Research Paper 12 (New York: UN, 1994), 5.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid, 6.

[39] Interview with Gen Meleshkov.

[40] Raymond C. Finch, III, "The Strange Case of Russian Peacekeeping Operations in the Near Abroad 1992-1994," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1996).

[41] Ibid.

[42] Roy Allison, "Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States," *Chaillot Paper #18*, November 1994), 14; online at

http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai18e.htm (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

[43] O'Prey, 8.

[44] Tom Wilhelm, "Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan," (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute), 11.

[45] Yentz.

[46] O'Prey, 9.

[47] Ibid.

[48] See Abkhazia case study for more information on Russia's perceived partiality in the region.

[49] Allison, 14.

[50] Yentz.

[51] Interview with Gen Reppert.

[52] For a good analysis of using combatants in peacekeeping forces, see Tom Wilhelm, "Using Belligerents as Peacekeepers" (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute).

[53] "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," NATO homepage, 1 October 1999, online at http://www.nato.int (Accessed on 5 Mar 00).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Carter and. Perry, 43.

[57] Ibid, 45.

[58] Ibid.

[59] "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR," Joint US/Russian Research Project of the Foreign Military Studies office (FMSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Center for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow, Russia, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1998), Chapter 3.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Major Fernando Buesa, "Russians Homeland Defense Day in Ugljevik," *SFOR Informer #31*, 11 March 1998, 1.

[62] Ibid.

[63] "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.

[64] Ibid.

[65] E-mail interview with Major Warren, US Army (served as FAO in SFOR Aug-Dec 1998), 22 March 00.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Interview with anonymous US officer.

[68] Ibid.

[69] General William Nash (US Army, Retired), "Give the Russians a Chance," *New York Times*, 22 June 1999, Op-Ed Section.

[70] Interview with Gen Nash.

[71] Interview with anonymous US officer.

[72] Interview with Col Kaufmann.

[73] Ibid.

[74] E-mail interview with Captain Eric M. Leyde (current LNO to the Russian Brigade), 28 Mar 00.

[75] Interview with anonymous US officer.

[76] Interview with Col Kaufmann.

[77] Interview with Gen Nash.

[78] Interview with Col Greer.

[79] Interview with Capt Leyde.

[80]"Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid.

[83] The research team was composed of members from The Center for Military-Strategic Research of the Russian General Staff and the Foreign Military Studies Office of the US Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned. The survey was conducted during August-October 1997.

[84] Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, "US-Russian Military Cooperation and the IFOR Experience: A Comparison of Survey Results," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, September 1998).

[85]Ibid.

[86] Finch, 3.

[87] Ibid.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Finch, 3.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] According to Finch, there exists a considerable body of evidence that the Abkhazians received support from a number of different Russian groups. For examples, see Catherine Dale, "Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses," (RFE/RL Research Report, 27 August 1993), 48-57; Dr. Tamara Gragadze, "Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (February 1994), 71-73.

[93] Misha Glenny, "The Bear in the Caucasus," *Harpers* (March 1994), 49.

[94] "The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeping," (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 576-7.

[95] "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia" (S/1999/1087), 22 October 1999.

[96] "The Blue Helmets," 578.

[97] Interview with UN official Wolfgang Weber, 24 Jan 2000.

[98] Interview with Major Owen Cheney, US Army, UN Military Observer in Georgia, 19 Jan 2000.

[99] "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."

[100] Ibid.

[101] Interview with Maj Cheney.

[102] "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."

[103] Ibid.

[104] Interview with Maj Cheney.

[105] Owen Cheney, "UNOMIG Mandated Observance of CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia," 5 August 1998.

[106] Irakli Zurab Kakabadze, "Russian Troops in Abkhazia: Peacekeeping, or Keeping Both Pieces?" *Perspectives on Central Asia*, Vol II, No. 6 (September 1997), Center for Political and Strategic Studies, online at

http://www.cpss.org/casianw/perca0997.txt (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000).

[107] Interview with Weber.

[108] O'Prey, 29.

[109] Henry E. Hale, *Russian Election Watch No. 8, March 15, 2000*, (Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University), 2.

[110] O'Prey, 29.

[111] Evans.

[112] For a more detailed discussion, see pages 58-62.

[113] "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.

[114] Interview with Capt Leyde.

[115] Interview with Maj Warren.

[116] Interview with Capt Leyde.

[117] "Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."

[118] Because the attempt to introduce a UN protection force was refused by Russia, the UN mission hired seventeen international and thirty-four local armed guards. Contracting armed guards is cheaper than a UN protection force and does little to harm the US-Russian relationship. UN observers would then be able to expand their patrols and maintain more team bases with less fear of criminal groups or partisans. They would thus be able to fulfill more of their mandate and provide more stability in the region. The armed guards will require a commitment of funds (around $1M/year) from the UN, but without the added security, UN observers will continue to be unable to fulfill their mandate.

[119] "The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) Initiative." Briefing slides, Office of the DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, May 1998, 3.

[120] "Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations," Chapter 4.

[121] Problems arose in the summer of 1999 when many questioned if the Russians were passing information to Serbian President Milosevic.

[122] *Peacetime Engagement Planning Reference Book*, Joint Staff Publication, June 1999, 308.

[123] The following levels of Russian participation in US courses were submitted as part of the FY 00 IMET proposed training plan: Civil-Military Strategy for International Development (2 persons), Language Instructor (6 persons), Executive Program in Civilian Military Relations (3 persons), and Legal Considerations in Military and Peace Operations (4 persons).

[124] Interview with Gen Reppert.

[125] Interview with Capt Leyde.

[126] Interview with Maj King.

[127] O'Prey, 29.